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he hypothesis that cognition, and the mind more 
generally, might extend beyond the margins of the 
body came to prominence in the 1990s. The most oft-cited 
source is Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ celebrated 1998 
article ‘The Extended Mind’. The six papers in this issue of 
Essays in Philosophy explore various aspects of the extended 
mind thesis and related ideas. While all but one of them 
discuss Clark and Chalmers’ article, and all are sympathetic 
to the extended mind movement, the later papers in the issue 
are increasingly of the opinion that it is time for the 
movement to abandon that early framework. 
 
MIND AND COGNITION: EXTENDED OR 
EMBEDDED? 
 
The pivotal example in Clark and Chalmers’ article is now 
one of the most well-known thought experiments in 
T 
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philosophy: Otto, the Alzheimer’s patient who uses his 
notebook to help him navigate the world—and in particular, 
to navigate his way to the Museum of Modern Art. The 
notebook itself, Clark and Chalmers argued, contains some 
of Otto’s beliefs. One suspects that the popularity of the 
example was buoyed by the commercial introduction of 
smartphones (the first iPhone was released in 2007). Many 
people now find it increasingly easy to consider the 
electronic device in their pocket as an extension of their 
mind.  
 
However, there has also been plenty of resistance (to Clark 
and Chalmers’ claim; less so to smartphones, which are now 
found in the pockets of more than half of the US population). 
One prominent challenge, from Robert Rupert, says that 
there is no reason to prefer the thesis that the mind extends 
into the organism’s environment over the weaker thesis that 
it is merely embedded within the environment. The latter 
thesis accepts the deep dependence of cognition on external 
resources, but denies that such resources partly constitute 
that cognition. Our first two papers both defend the extended 
mind thesis against this challenge.  
 
Andrew Winters addresses the particular objection that the 
extended mind thesis, unlike the embedded alternative, 
cannot explain an apparent asymmetry between the organism 
and its external resources. For example, if we separate Otto 
from his notebook, only one of the two resulting entities is 
minded. Otto remains a cognitive system (albeit a debilitated 
one), and thus will still engage in many of the activities 
typical of such systems; whereas the notebook will be inert. 
(Even a smartphone is not so smart if abandoned in a 
taxicab.) The external props depend on the brain for their 
cognitive status, but not the reverse. For Rupert, this 
asymmetry favors the embedded thesis. In “Cognitive 
Processes and Asymmetrical Dependencies, or How 
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Thinking Is Like Swimming”, Winters counters that the 
extended thesis can explain the asymmetry in the context of 
a process ontology. He uses the analogy of swimming. If 
Otto goes swimming, his activity depends on a body of water 
to such an extent that the water is part of the swimming. But 
of course the water does not continue to be part of an act of 
swimming once Otto leaves the pool. Since swimming is a 
process, it is temporally delimited; and hence so are its parts. 
For this reason, swimming is asymmetrically dependent on 
the medium in which it occurs. Similarly, Winters argues, if 
cognition is a process, then Otto’s notebook can be part of 
his cognitive activity of navigating to MoMA and yet not be 
a cognitive system on its own.  
 
Caroline King’s “Learning Disability and the Extended 
Mind” takes a different approach to the debate between the 
extended mind thesis and the embedded mind thesis, but also 
defends the former. She adopts a normative perspective, by 
connecting the debate to questions about the cognitive 
abilities of learning-disabled people. It is often noted that 
such individuals can be brought to a neurotypical level of 
cognitive performance if they are supplied with appropriate 
assistive technologies or environmental scaffolding. The 
question then occurs: are we to regard the individual’s 
cognitive abilities as being only those abilities that they can 
exhibit when unassisted? Or should we also include the 
further abilities that they can exhibit with assistance? This is 
no small matter, for what abilities a person is held to possess 
may determine what opportunities they are given, what 
responsibilities they are allowed to take on, and indeed their 
entire living situation. The choice between conceiving of the 
mind as extended or as embedded, King claims, is thus 
extremely consequential in this context. For, she argues, the 
extended thesis allows us to judge that an individual’s 
cognitive abilities can be enhanced by the integration of 
external tools, whereas the embedded thesis entails that such 
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tools serve merely to pick up the slack for abilities which the 
individual themselves lacks. King argues that insofar as we 
think that the former judgment is the normatively correct 
one, we have reason to favor the extended thesis over the 
embedded thesis. 
 
BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH MERLEAU-PONTY 
 
Despite their view’s novelty at the time, Clark and Chalmers 
were located firmly within the standard framework of 
analytic philosophy of mind, especially in assuming a 
representationalist and functionalist approach to cognition. 
They argued that the contents of Otto’s notebook function 
like the contents of certain of his brain states. Our remaining 
four papers reject that approach in one way or another, by 
emphasizing either the role of the body and the world in 
cognition, or the sociality of cognition.  
 
Our third and fourth contributions examine the work of 
French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. They 
argue that he was far ahead of the curve in recognizing the 
deep flaws in the traditional Cartesian picture of the body as 
a mere tool of the mind.  
 
In “Merleau-Ponty on Embodied Cognition: A 
Phenomenological Interpretation of Spinal Cord Epidural 
Stimulation and Paralysis”, Brock Bahler reviews some 
startling recent clinical research by neuroscientist Susan 
Harkema. Working with four patients who had been 
paralyzed from the chest down, Harkema has used spinal 
cord epidural stimulation to restore voluntary control of hips, 
legs, and toes. The four men became able not only to stand, 
but to walk, and even to regain bladder control and sexual 
function. These results suggest that the spinal cord is no 
mere conduit for the brain to communicate with the 
extremities, but that it can control and execute complex 
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movements on its own, without input from the brain, by 
drawing directly on its embedding in the body and the 
environment. Bahler argues that Merleau-Ponty effectively 
laid a theoretical groundwork which would predict such 
findings, for he held that thinking is not an activity that 
occurs in some isolated mental realm, but rather in the body 
and the world. In an analogy used by Bahler and by Merleau-
Ponty himself, as I type these words my brain does not retain 
a centralized and representationally-mediated control over 
my actions. The control exists in my fingers, indeed in my 
entire body, and even in the keyboard itself. Harkema’s 
results suggest that Merleau-Ponty was 70 years ahead of his 
time, and that we may only now be beginning to catch up 
with him.  
 
Gina Zavota’s “Expanding the Extended Mind: Merleau-
Ponty’s Late Ontology as Radical Enactive Cognition” 
focuses on one of Merleau-Ponty’s last works, The Visible 
and the Invisible, left as an incomplete manuscript at his 
death in 1961. Echoing Bahler’s claim that Merleau-Ponty 
effectively anticipated recent findings in clinical neurology, 
Zavota argues that by the end of his life he had adopted a 
view of the constitution of the self which is more radical than 
even some of today’s most avowedly radical views. She 
takes as an example Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s 
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. 
Hutto and Myin argue that representation, rather than being 
a universal feature of mentality, is merely an outgrowth of 
the linguistic abilities of cognitively sophisticated creatures, 
such as ourselves. Mentality in its basic form consists in an 
organism’s interactions with its environment; and moreover, 
the environment is not secondary to the brain, but rather 
contributes in an equal partnership with it. Zavota suggests 
that Merleau-Ponty came to occupy an even more radical 
position: that the brain and the environment are not equal 
partners, but form a fundamental unity in which the 
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contributions of the one and the other cannot be 
distinguished. This unity Merleau-Ponty called “flesh”, and 
in The Visible and the Invisible he was setting out an 
“ontology of the flesh” in which perceiver and perceived are 
so deeply interconnected as to be reversible. 
 
MENTAL WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN! 
 
In a paper which has notable resonances with Zavota’s, 
Makoto Kureha explores John Dewey’s theory of cognition 
as an alternative to the extended mind thesis. While 
proponents of that thesis often cite Dewey as a forerunner, 
in “The Unbounded and Social Mind: Dewey on the Locus 
of Mind” Kureha argues that they have misunderstood him. 
The extended mind thesis says that the mind, although 
centered on individual organisms, extends some distance 
outward from those organisms into the environment. 
According to Kureha, Dewey would reject two key 
assumptions of this thesis: that the mind belongs to 
individuals, and (relatedly) that it has a boundary. Kureha 
suggests that extended mind theorists share these 
assumptions with their avowed opponents, internalists—and 
that they therefore cannot offer an explanatorily superior 
alternative to internalism. Dewey, by contrast, urges us not 
to think of mind as an entity with a spatial location, but as an 
activity which is united with matter and life in a continuous 
process. (It is here, especially, that I think one might see a 
resonance between Dewey’s view and Merleau-Ponty’s, as 
outlined by Zavota.) In particular, Kureha points out the 
similarity between Dewey’s view and the more recent 
socially distributed cognition theory associated with Edwin 
Hutchins and Ronald Giere, which recommends shifting the 
focus of cognitive science onto symbol manipulation in 
socio-cultural systems.  
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This is a neat segue into the issue’s final contribution, in 
which J. M. Fritzman and Kristin Thornburg describe the 
fourth wave of the extended mind movement as being 
something very similar to, and perhaps identical with, 
socially distributed cognition theory. Where Kureha saw that 
theory as having been anticipated by Dewey, in their “‘I Is 
Someone Else’: Constituting the Extended Mind’s Fourth 
Wave, with Hegel”, Fritzman and Thornburg see the fourth 
wave as having been anticipated by Hegel. They draw also 
on the recent work of Joseph Henrich and colleagues, who 
argued that Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic (WEIRD) people are highly unrepresentative of 
humanity at large. Fritzman and Thornburg point out in 
particular that WEIRD people are notably individualistic, 
holding that the mind is sequestered within the boundary of 
the skin. And WEIRD philosophers are no exception (indeed 
I would add, in all seriousness, that in them the WEIRDness 
is exacerbated). For this reason, the trajectory of the 
extended mind movement has been a procedure of gradually 
and fitfully releasing the mind from the spatial strictures of 
the brain. Fritzman and Thornburg urge that we must 
abandon this laborious procedure and begin with the premise 
of group cognition. For one thing, they observe, Hegel 
taught us that individuals and groups are mutually co-
determining. And for another, this is the only way to 
counteract our WEIRD presuppositions. 
 
